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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION OF VESSELS
Appellant is a domiciliary of Ohio and operates its boats
and barges on the Ohio River. These vessels occasionally stop at
a port in the State of Ohio for minor repairs and for fuel, but
they do not enter Ohio, because the latter's boundary is the
north bank of the Ohio River, the vessels therefore being in Ken-
tucky. Aside from these occasional visits, the appellant's vessels
travel only seventeen and one-half miles along waters which
border Ohio, their other travel being in and along the borders of
Kentucky, Indiana, and other states. The State of Ohio placed a
tax on the appellant for the total value of all the latter's per-
sonal property and the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the tax.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Mr.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, said: "The rule
which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportion-
ment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state
of domicile .... Otherwise there would be multiple taxation of
interstate operations' and the tax would have no relation to the
opportunities, benefits, or protection which the taxing state gives
those operations." 2 Standard Oil Company v. Peck, 72 S. Ct. 309,
96 L. Ed. 271 (U.S. 1952).
The Roman theory of mobilia sequuntur personam, taxation
of movables at the owner's domicile, and the later theory of
le situs, have contributed to what may be today called the mod-
em rule, that is, "unless it has acquired an actual situss else-
where, the situs of a vessel for the purpose of taxation is the
domicile of the owner." 4 The major question which this rule
engenders is just what is an "actual situs elsewhere." The earlier
cases lead us to believe that the actual situs depends on the per-
manency of the vessel within a particular state or the regularity
of its travel therein.
In the early history of this problem, the court dealt primarily
1. This phrase tends to show that the Court is basing its decision on
the commerce clause and the balance of the brief opinion supports this
conclusion. However, the next phrase is couched in traditional language of
due process, although the opinion makes no further reference to it.
2. 72 S. Ct. 309, 310 (U.S. 1952).
3. Where the vessel is physically located.
4. 6 A.L.R. 2d 1368 (1949).
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with seagoing vessels. It was eventually well settled that the
place of domicile 5 would remain the situs for taxation unless
an actual situs elsewhere could be established. The fact that the
vessel merely touched a state's port to discharge cargo or passen-
gers was not enough to establish a taxable situs6-nor was the
fact that the vessel remained in the port for a long period of
time, provided the reason for this was of an involuntary nature.7
Furthermore, it was said that "a vessel which never touches the
State of domicile does not lose its tax situs in that State by
visiting even the port of registry, if such visit is merely in the
course of interstate commerce." 5 On the other hand, the court
held that a tax situs was established when the vessels remained
continuously within a particular state throughout the tax year,
despite the. fact that this state was not the state of domicile.9
There have been decisions which imply that for a vessel to have
a tax situs within a particular state it must become incorporated
with the personal property of that state.10 Of course this pre-
sents the question of what constitutes incorporation into the
property of a state. If the cases stopped here it might fairly well
be determined that for a vessel to acquire a tax situs other than
that of the state of domicile, it must be used consistently in that
other state throughout the year.
The problem grows more complex in the light of several
railroad cases which held that it was not in keeping with the
Constitution for one state to collect all of the taxes for rolling
stock, when this property was also being continually used in
and protected by other states." However, here too it was con-
sidered necessary that the railroad cars establish an actual situs
for taxation, that is, a certain specific number, or average, of
cars must be proved to have been within the state for the entire
taxable year.' 2 Due to the impossibility of keeping an accurate
account of the number of cars in the state during a given year,
5. Port of registry was also used, but it is not discussed in this note.
6. 6 A.L.R. 2d 1368 (1949). Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,
141 U.S. 18 (1891).
7. Guinness v. King County, 202 P. 2d 737 (Wash. 1949). 6 A.L.R. 2d
1368 (1949). However, financial embarrassment was not considered cause
enough to free the owner from the necessity of paying taxes to the state in
which his vessel lay. Bush v. State, 140 Fla. 277, 191 So. 515 (1939).
8. New York Central R.R. v. State Department of Taxation and Finance,
137 N.J.L. 288, 293, 59 A. 2d 859, 861 (1948). The court cited as authority for
this statement Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
9. Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
10. Guinness v. King County, 202 P. 2d 737 (Wash. 1949).
11. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
12. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
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an assessment basis of taxation was allowed by the court, based
on the number of miles of track.13
In summary, it has been shown that vessels, until 1949 at
least, were required to remain permanently in a non-domiciliary
state to acquire a tax situs there, and were otherwise taxable
only in the state of domicile. Railroad cars, on the other hand,
could establish a situs in foreign states merely by establishing
an average amount which pass through that state throughout
the tax year. In the only case involving a third media of trans-
portation-by air-the court held that the domiciliary state had
the right to tax airplanes to their full value despite the fact that
they regularly and continuously spent a majority of their time
flying over and landing in other states.14 This decision follows
those which dealt with seagoing vessels, and rejected the theory
of apportionment which had been applied to railroad rolling
stock.
In 1949, in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company5
the assessment theory, or apportionment theory, of taxation of
railroad rolling stock was applied to barges traveling up and
down the inland rivers. The apportionment theory is based on
two concepts: first, that it must be determined "what portion
of an interstate organism may appropriately be attributed to
each of the various states in which it functions," 16 which is one
of the problems under the commerce clause, and second, that
there is a desire under the due process clause to grant the states
the right to tax in proportion to the benefits and protection be-
stowed by them on the property subject to tax.'7
The present case arose when the state of domicile sought to
tax the entire value of the vessels, which in effect is the reverse
of Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company, 8 where a
non-domiciliary state successfully taxed an apportioned share
of the owner's property. Justice Minton, in the instant case,
points out that no other state had taxed the property in question
and that no actual situs outside the domiciliary state has been
proved, and his statement is correct. He bases his dissent on the
opinion rendered in Southern Pacific Company v. Kentucky,' 9
13. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
14. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
15. 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
16. Nashville v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 365 (1940).
17. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
1& Ibid.
19. 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
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wherein it was decided that since the property in question had
not established an actual situs elsewhere it was subject to taxa-
tion by the state of domicile, despite the fact that it had never
been in or touched that state. This theory was originally predi-
cated on the reasoning that if the property was not subject to
taxation by the state of domicile it could completely avoid all
taxation, since it might not necessarily have established a situs
in any other state. Furthermore, as Justice Minton persuasively
argues, this doctrine was seemingly reinforced as recently as
1944 when applied to air transportation in the Northwest Air-
lines case.2 ) Upon what theory was that decision based? Was it
because the court felt that the planes were actually operating in
federally regulated skies and therefore received their protection
from the federal government and not the particular state over
which they were flying? This would seem to be a complete dis-
regard for the geographical boundaries of the states. Perhaps
the court felt that airplanes were in a class all their own and
thus preferred to treat them as analogous to the seagoing vessels,
rather than to railroad cars. This seems to be the more logical
answer. However, if this be the reason, then the authority that
this case had would apparently be dissolved by a statement in
the opinion of the instant case, referring to Ott v. Mississippi
Barge Lines Company,2 ' that "In that way' we placed inland
water transportation on the same footing as other interstate
enterprises." 22 (Italics supplied.) If the court meant merely
railroads, presumably it would have said so; therefore some sig-
nificance must be attached to the fact that it said "other inter-
state enterprises," which necessarily includes air travel. While
this statement fails actually to overrule the airline case, it does
suggest a disregard for the decision.
The Court seems to feel that as long as the property is
within the jurisdiction of other states and not necessarily another
particular state, its taxes should be apportioned according to the
benefits received. There seems to be little or no concern over
the fact that the property would not be taxed until the various
foreign states decide to exercise their right of taxation; nor was
there much concern expressed over Justice Minton's belief that
it would be hard to establish an actual situs for taxation due to
the fact that the vessels would invariably be crossing the thread
20. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
21. 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
22. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 72 S. Ct. 309, 310 (U.S. 1952).
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of the stream when following the channels of the river,23 thereby
making it rather difficult to ascertain how much time was spent
in a particular state. In the writer's opinion this case estab-
lishes an entirely new angle as to the rights of the states to tax,
and it brushes aside the belief than an actual situs must first be
proved in order to deprive the domiciliary state of her tax
rights, in favor of a doctrine which merely requires the possi-
bility of taxation by other states on an apportionment basis.
Robert Lee Curry III
TORTS-LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNER FOR
DRIVER'S NEGLIGENCE
Defendant and his friend, after eating dinner at the home
of a relative of defendant, drove to a liquor store in defendant's
automobile and purchased whiskey to be used in making egg
nog. During their return to the relative's residence, defendant
permitted the friend to drive the car, as the latter had never
operated an automobile equipped with overdrive and "he wanted
to see how it handled." The friend, in the course of the journey,
negligently struck plaintiff's car and the plaintiff brought suit
to recover damages. Held, negligence of the driver was im-
puted to defendant owner, inasmuch as both were participating
in a joint venture or joint enterprise. Buquet v. St. Amant, 55
So. 2d 645 (La. App. 1951).
While the doctrine of joint enterprise is not new in the field
of automobile law, its purpose at its inception was in marked
contrast to the role it seems destined to assume. At the outset
the doctrine represented a partial revival of the rule of "imputed
negligence" as voiced by the classic English case of Thorogood
v. Bryan.' Under both doctrines the negligence of the driver is
imputed to the passenger on some theory of agency,2 but joint
enterprise is definitely an exception to the broad theory of negli-
gence which the Thorogood case represents. The great majority
23. Id. at 311.
1. 8 C.B. 115 (1849).
2. On the point that the basis of joint enterprise doctrine is some theory
of mutual agency, see Farthering v. Hepinstall, 243 Mich. 380, 220 N.W. 708
(1928); Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N.E. 137 (1929); Robinson v.
Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nay. Co., 90 Ore. 490, 176 Pac. 594 (1918). Of
course, in all these cases no actual agency exists, for if one did exist there
would be no need to resort to a theory other than respondeat superior to
obtain the desired result.
1952).
